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Abstract
Surprisingly little is known about the impact of natural resource booms on income
inequality in resource rich countries (Ross, 2007). This paper develops a theory, in
the context of a two sector growth model in which learning-by-doing drives growth, to
explain the time path of inequality following a resource boom. Under the condition
that the nontraded sector uses unskilled labor more intensively than the traded sector,
we nd that income inequality will fall in the short run immediately after a boom,
and will then increase steadily over time as the economy grows, until the initial impact
of the boom on inequality disappears. Using dynamic panel data estimation for 90
countries between 1965 and 1999, and exploiting variation in world commodity prices
to identify resource booms, we nd evidence in support of the theory, especially for
oil and mineral booms. We also nd that uncertainty about future commodity export
prices signicantly increases long-run inequality.
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1 Introduction
Large windfalls from periodical commodity booms pose important questions for policy makers
in natural resource-rich economies. The question that has received most attention is how the
windfalls can be used to promote economic growth. However, surprisingly little is known about
the impact of booms on income inequality (Ross, 2007). The persistence of high poverty rates in
many resource-rich economies makes the question of how booms a¤ect the distribution of income
between the rich and the poor particularly relevant.
A useful starting point for our analysis is the theory of Dutch Disease. The resource rev-
enues lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which harms the competitiveness of the
non-resource exports sector and hampers economic growth if there are positive externalities to
production in this sector (Corden and Neary, 1982; Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Torvik, 2001). We
develop a theory, in the context of a two sector growth model in which learning-by-doing drives
growth, to explain the time path of inequality following a natural resource boom (dened as either
a discovery or an exogenous world price increase). Under the plausible conditions of low elasticity
of substitution between nontraded and traded goods in consumption, a nontraded sector that is
relatively intensive in its use of unskilled labor, and balanced growth, we nd that income inequal-
ity will fall in the short run immediately after a boom, and will then increase steadily over time
as the economy grows, until the initial impact of the boom on inequality disappears.
We then test the predictions of the model empirically, using a dynamic panel data estimator for
90 countries between 1965 and 1999, and exploiting exogenous variation in world commodity prices
to identify natural resource booms. Our results support the theory. Resource booms, especially
oil and mineral booms, lower inequality in the year of the boom. This e¤ect then gradually
diminishes over time until inequality returns to its pre-boom level in the long run. In addition
to the estimated e¤ects of resource booms, we also nd that uncertainty about future commodity
export prices signicantly increases long-run inequality.
This paper is loosely related to the literature on natural resource endowments and inequality.
Leamer et al. (1999) argue that, since resource exploitation does not require much human capital,
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the labor force in resource rich economies is unprepared for the emergence of human-capital-
intensive manufacturing. As a result, these economies may experience higher income inequality
for longer periods than resource-scarce economies. Sokolo¤ and Engerman (2000) instead point
at how resource endowments a¤ect inequality through the evolution of institutions. In colonies
where economies of scale led to unequal land ownership, the inequality was sustained by political
institutions that favored the rich and excluded the poor. In other colonies, however, the absence
of economies of scale led to a more equal land distribution and more egalitarian institutions. Gyl-
fason and Zoega (2003) argue that resource dependence leads to both lower growth and increased
inequality, and could therefore explain the inverse relationship between growth and inequality in
cross-country data. Finally, this paper is related to Ross (2007), who discusses mechanisms through
which mineral wealth could a¤ect inequality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model and analyzes
the e¤ects of a resource boom on inequality in the short and long run. Section three describes the
empirical analysis. Section four discusses the estimation results. Section ve concludes.
2 The Model
Our model of the dependent economy has a nontraded sector, which we call the N sector, and
a non-resource traded sector, which we call the T sector. The resource sector of the model is
represented as an exogenous gift of resource income R.1
We normalize the population to be equal to 1. The population consists of L unskilled workers
and S skilled workers, with L + S = 1: Both skilled and unskilled labor, the only factors of
production, are required to produce N and T goods, and the factor stocks are xed at L and S,
1 In specifying the resource income in this manner, we eliminate the possibility of the resource movement e¤ect
(Cordon and Neary, 1982) to play a role in the adjustment of the economy to shocks, and focus exclusively on the
spending e¤ect, which has been acknowledged widely as the main force driving adjustment in most resource rich
countries. It is worth noting, however, that inclusion of the former e¤ect in the model, in our case by allowing skilled
but not unskilled workers to be employed competitively in the resource sector, would likely dampen somewhat our
result on the short run fall in inequality.
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as noted above. Letting LN and LT represent the unskilled labor force in the N and T sectors,
respectively, the market clearing condition for unskilled labor can be written as LN + LT = L:
Similarly, the market clearing condition for skilled labor can be written as SN + ST = S; where
SN and ST represent the skilled labor force in the respective sectors.2
To close the short run specication of the model, in which productivity in each sector is constant,
we must specify the production functions, prot maximization conditions, preferences, and demand
functions. For simplicity, we will assume Cobb Douglas production functions in each sector, with
a unit elasticity of substitution between factors and constant returns to scale. Denoting output
and productivity in the sectors by Xj and Aj , respectively, we have
XN = ANS
SN
N L
LN
N and XT = ATS
ST
T L
LT
T : (1)
Constant returns to scale implies that Sj+Lj = 1; j = N;T . We make the assumption henceforth
that the nontraded sector is relatively intensive in its use of unskilled labor: LN > LT : Addi-
tionally, we dene ij as the proportion of the supply of factor i used by sector j in equilibrium.
Market clearing requires that iN + iT = 1; i = L; S.
Both unskilled and skilled labor must earn their marginal products, and assuming perfect factor
mobility, the marginal product of each factor must be equal across sectors. This gives the wage w
of the unskilled worker and the wage v of the skilled worker, respectively, as
w = pNX
0
N (LN ) = X
0
T (LT ) and v = pNX
0
N (SN ) = X
0
T (ST ); (2)
where pN is the relative price of nontraded goods in terms of traded goods.
All agents are assumed to have identical preferences, and maximize a CES aggregator of N and
2We focus on skilled and unskilled labor as factors of production in order to analyze the e¤ects of resource booms
on the personal income distribution. Additionally, our model of long run growth driven by learning-by-doing is
framed more naturally in a setting where both types of workers are capable of LBD in both sectors. Our model is
formally equivalent to a version formulated using capital and labor, however, and all our core results carry through
so long as we maintain the assumption that the traded sector uses skilled labor (capital) more intensively than the
nontraded sector, or equivalently that the nontraded sector uses unskilled labor (labor) more intensively than the
traded sector.
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T good consumption, which is given by
U =
h
(1  )1=C
 1

T + ()
1=C
 1

N
i 
 1
(3)
Here  is the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods. Since agents have
identical preferences, we can treat aggregate consumption of the two goods as being determined
by the decision of a representative agent who chooses CN and CT to maximize U subject to the
budget constraint of the entire economy,
pNCN + CT = Y: (4)
Here Y = pNXN +XT +ATR is aggregate income. A boom will be considered as an increase in R.
It is rst important to note that resource income will be measured in the productivity units AT of
the traded sector, as in Torvik (2001). This detail is irrelevant in the short run, when productivity
in both sectors is constant, but will be highly relevant in the transition to the long run, when
productivity in both sectors is growing. Second, the assumption that skilled and unskilled workers
have identical tastes rules out the possibility for demand composition e¤ects to play any role in
the economys response to booms. As in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996), the overall price index in the
economy, P , for the consumption basket that is the solution to the consumers problem is given by
P =

1   + p1 N
 1
1  (5)
The demand functions for traded and nontraded goods respectively are given by
CT = (1  )P 1Y and CN = P  1p N Y: (6)
The model is closed by the requirement that the market for nontraded goods must clear: XN = CN :
By WalrasLaw, we can omit the market equilibrium for traded goods.
2.1 Measuring Inequality
There are two main sources of changes in income inequality during resource booms that concern
us: the unequal distribution of resource income, and the shift of the factors of production to the
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nontraded sector, which uses unskilled labor intensively relative to the traded sector, due to the
spending e¤ect related to the resource income. We will rst dene a natural measure of non-
resource income inequality based on the factor distribution of income, and relate this measure to
the Gini coe¢ cient of non-resource income inequality in our economy. Then, we will discuss how
our results on changes in non-resource income inequality must be modied to take into account
inequality in the receipt of resource income between unskilled and skilled workers.
The natural measure of non-resource income inequality we will focus on is the ratio of the total
wage income earned by skilled workers to the total wage income earned by unskilled workers:
I =
vS
wL
: (7)
This structural measure of non-resource income inequality captures the value share of skilled labor
in producing output as a multiple of the value share of unskilled labor in producing output, with an
emphasis that is consistent with the empirical ndings of Daudey and García-Peñalosa (2007) that
relative factor returns are a key driver of the inequality of the personal income distribution. Lemma
1 relates this measure of inequality to the Gini coe¢ cient of non-resource income inequality:
Lemma 1 Let the Gini coe¢ cient of non-resource income inequality be denoted by G. If w < v,
then G = L  1=(1 + I), and if w  v; then G = S   I=(1 + I):
Proof. The result follows from the denition of the Gini coe¢ cient after routine calculations.
We will assume throughout the rest of the analysis that w < v, as consistent with the fact that
skilled labor is relatively scarce and commands a higher wage. In this context, we see that G is a
nonlinear, increasing function of I for a given unskilled labor supply L. Thus, the above lemma
shows that our results on the sign of changes in I in the model can be used immediately to sign
changes in the non-resource income Gini coe¢ cient G, in the short run and the long run.
Since we are interested in the e¤ects of resource booms on total income inequality, we next
address the distribution of resource income among skilled and unskilled workers. Suppose that
each unskilled worker earns total income w + ATR and each skilled worker earns total income
v + ATR, where ATR is the value of the resource income measured in productivity units of the
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traded sector. Let the Gini coe¢ cient of total income inequality be denoted by GT and the Gini
coe¢ cient of resource income inequality be denoted by GR. Let yNR  wL + vS = pNXN +XT
denote the total value of non-resource income, let yR  ATR denote the total value of resource
income, and let y = yNR+yR denote the total income of the economy. Then we have the following:
Lemma 2 For any  > 0 and  > 0 such that L + S = 1, the Gini coe¢ cient GT of total
income inequality in the economy can be represented as follows, for the three possible cases:
1. If   , then GT = (yNR=y)G+ (yR=y)GR.
2. If  >  and ATR < (v   w)=(  ), then GT = (yNR=y)G+ (yR=y)GR   2R( )LSy
3. If  >  and ATR  (v   w)=(  ), then GT = (yNR=y)G+ (yR=y)GR   2(v w)LSy :
Here G is the non-resource Gini coe¢ cient given in Lemma 1 for the case w < v, and the Gini
of resource income inequality is given by GR = 1  (S2 + 2min[; ]LS + L2):
Proof. The result follows from using the denitions of the total worker incomes, and the denition
of the Gini coe¢ cients constructed for the total, non-resource, and resource incomes of the indi-
vidual workers, with attention paid to how the assumptions that dene each case induce ordering
of the total, non-resource, and resource incomes, respectively.
2.2 The Short Run E¤ect of a Resource Boom on Income Inequality
It is a natural assumption that the movement of factors between sectors in response to the return
di¤erentials generated by a resource boom, or increase in R, will occur on a much faster timescale
than the productivity growth associated with changes in AN and AT over time. Before discussing
the dynamics of productivity growth, therefore, it is worth stating the response of G and GT to a
resource boom when productivity levels in the two sectors are constant. We focus on the case of
perfect factor mobility for both skilled and unskilled labor. This case is discussed in Corden and
Neary (1982), section III, in a model with capital and labor. The results carry over directly to
our measure of I in a model with skilled and unskilled labor. The net result on our measure of
inequality G therefore follows directly from Corden and Neary (1982) and Lemma 1 above:
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Proposition 3 We will have dG=dR < 0 if and only if LN > LT .
When spending e¤ects are the primary driver of short run adjustment to resource booms, non-
resource income inequality is likely to fall because in most countries, the nontraded sector, usually
identied with services, real estate, and sometimes agriculture, is likely to use unskilled labor more
intensively than the traded sector, which is usually identied with manufacturing.3
Unless the resource sector income constitutes a signicant proportion of total economy activity,
the behavior of G in response to resource booms will be the predominant driver of changes in GT ,
the Gini coe¢ cient of total income inequality, and we can expect GT to fall in the short run in
response to resource booms. In the general case, however, the fall in G will not be su¢ cient to
guarantee the fall in GT . Lemma 2 allows us to decompose the change in the Gini coe¢ cient of
total income inequality in response to a resource boom into three e¤ects, due respectively to a
change in the weighting of G and GR, the change in G itself, and a change in the corrective term in
cases 2 and 3. The following proposition summarizes a set of su¢ cient conditions that guarantee
a fall in the Gini of total income inequality in response to a boom:
Proposition 4 In cases 1 and 2 of Lemma 2, LN > LT and GR < G are su¢ cient conditions
to ensure that dGT =dR < 0, so that resource booms induce a fall in the Gini coe¢ cient of total
income inequality. In case 3 of Lemma 2, LN > LT and GR < G0 are su¢ cient conditions to
ensure that dGT =dR < 0, where G0  G  2L(I   S=L)=(1 + I).
Proof. The result of case 1 follows directly by computing dGT =dR = (d(yR=y)=dR)(GR   G) +
(1 yR=y)(dG=dR) and applying proposition 3. The result of case 2 follows from the case 1 result,
plus the fact that d(2(R=y)(   )LS)=dR > 0. The case 3 result follows by rearranging the
corrective term in order to re-write the formula for GT as GT = (yNR=y)G0 + (yR=y)GR, showing
that dG0=dI > 0, and applying the result from case 1.
3Although it does not bear on the empirics, it can be shown that the above result generalizes to the case of factor
specicity, and that only the magnitude of the change in inequality, rather than the sign, is a¤ected by relative
factor mobility. A proof of these claims is available from the authors upon request.
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In case 1, we see that our theoretical prediction of a short run fall in G carries over to a short
run fall in total inequality GT as well, and in fact, the fall in GT will be greater than the fall in G.
Moreover, the conditions given in Proposition 4 are su¢ cient, but not necessary, for a fall in the
total income Gini; GT will still fall in scenarios where the su¢ cient conditions stated above fail to
be satised at the margin. In fact, even when skilled workers receive more rents per capita than
unskilled workers ( > ), and GR > G, the fact that dG=dR < 0 for LN > LT implies that we
must have GR greater than some endogenous threshold, which is decreasing in R, in order to have
dGT =dR > 0. The signicant proportion of resource rents in total economic activity, and the high
inequality of the distribution of resource rents in favor of skilled workers, required to produce a rise
in the total income Gini seem unlikely to be satised by most resource rich countries in practice.
2.3 The Long Run E¤ect of a Resource Boom on Income Inequality
To analyze the transition of the economy to the long run, we relax the assumption of constant
TFP levels in the N and T sectors and specify dynamic equations governing productivity growth.
The rate of productivity growth in each sector will be endogenously determined, and we will
consider the e¤ects of learning-by-doing (LBD) in both sectors with the possibility of knowledge
spillovers. The model in this section is a generalization of Torvik (2001), who considers productivity
growth in a specic factors model without an explicit consideration of the role of skilled versus
unskilled labor. Including both factors makes it possible to study the level of inequality in the
balanced growth steady state and in response to resource booms.
The evolution of productivity in each sector is given by the following pair of di¤erential equa-
tions, which generalize the specication of Torvik (2001) to include the possibility of productivity
growth driven by LBD on the part of both skilled and unskilled workers in each sector:
_AN
AN
= uLLN + uSSN + T (vLLT + vSST ) (8)
_AT
AT
= N (uLLN + uSSN ) + vLLT + vSST (9)
Productivity growth is driven by LBD in both sectors, and the amount of LBD in a given sector
is determined by the level of employment of both types of workers in that sector. The strength of
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the e¤ect of unskilled workers on productivity growth in a given sector, however, may di¤er from
the strength of the e¤ect generated by skilled workers on productivity growth in the sector. The
direct e¤ect of unskilled worker employment on productivity growth in the N sector is measured
by the parameter uL, and the direct e¤ect of skilled worker employment on N sector productivity
growth is measured by the parameter uS . Similarly, vL measures the direct e¤ect of unskilled
worker employment in the T sector on T sector productivity growth, and vS measures the direct
e¤ect of skilled worker employment in the T sector on T sector productivity growth. The constants
T and N measure, respectively, the size of spillover e¤ects of LBD in the T sector on N sector
productivity growth, and of LBD in the N sector on T sector productivity growth. In this general
specication, both sectors have the capacity to generate productivity growth, as well as to benet
from productivity growth in the other sector.
In this general specication, it is possible to have balanced growth, with the ratio of productivity
levels in the two sectors constant, but not necessarily equal to one. If we dene this ratio by
 = AT =AN ; then the rate of change of the ratio over time is governed by
_

=
_AT
AT
 
_AN
AN
=  (1  N )(uLLN + uSSN ) + (1  T )(vLLT + vSST ): (10)
To determine dynamic stability, it is necessary to see for what range of  the growth rate of the
productivity di¤erential, _=, is positive and for what range it is negative. Let  denote the
value at which _= = 0: To achieve such a dynamic equilibrium, we solve the equation implied
by _= = 0 to obtain the following linear relationship between LN and 

SN , the equilibrium
proportion of unskilled and skilled labor in the N sector, respectively:
SN =
( 1 T1 N )(vL + vS)
uS + (
1 T
1 N )vS
 
 
uL + (
1 T
1 N )vL
uS + (
1 T
1 N )vS
!
LN (11)
Here we have made use of the fact that both the proportions of skilled labor and the proportions
of unskilled labor in the two sectors must sum to one. It should be remarked that, while this
relationship between the shares of unskilled and skilled labor in the N sector must always hold
in a long run balanced growth equilibrium, shocks to resource income R will induce short run
deviations of the labor allocations away from their long run equilibrium values.
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It can be seen that the level of  corresponding to LN and 

SN depends on the resource
income R. If _= > 0 for  > ; the system will be unstable, and will exhibit unbalanced growth
leading to complete specialization in one sector or the other. Conversely, if _= < 0 for  > ;
the system will be stable, and will exhibit balanced growth in equilibrium, with the ratio of sector
productivities given by : It is the latter case, of course, that most interests us here. The following
Proposition states the condition for dynamic stability, along with the factor allocations and the
factor income inequality I that obtain in the unique long run dynamically stable equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Dynamic stability of the system requires that   1: For the case  < 1, there
exists a unique set of factor allocations in the N and T sectors. These are given by solving
ST
LT

1  LN
1  SN (LN )

=
SN
LN
LN
SN (

LN )
(12)
for LN , where we can write 

SN = 

SN (

LN ) according to equation 11, and 

LT and 

ST are
obtained by invoking full factor utilization. Equilibrium factor inequality is given by I = SNLN
LN
SN
.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition is contained in the Appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the long run equilibrium in the Edgeworth-Bowley box, with skilled labor
on the vertical and unskilled labor on the horizontal axis. The nontraded sector unskilled labor
force and nontraded sector skilled labor force are measured as distances from the point ON in the
bottom left hand corner, and the traded sector unskilled and skilled labor forces are measured
as distances from the top right hand corner. The curve is drawn in (LN ; SN ) space. We have
drawn the contract curve so that it lies everywhere below the diagonal 45 degree line ONOT ,
which corresponds to the assumption that the N sector is relatively unskilled labor intensive. Also
intersected with the contract curve is a bold, downward sloping line, which corresponds to the
condition of long run dynamic equilibrium in the general case summarized by equation 11, with
parameters chosen so that the long run equilibrium locus is described by the line SN = 1:5 2LN .
More unequal economies will be those in which more activity is concentrated in the relatively
skilled labor intensive sector. If this is the T sector, that means that inequality is decreasing as we
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move right on the horizontal axis from the point ON : higher values for 

LN correspond to lower
equilibrium inequality in a balanced growth economy. 4
Now let us examine the e¤ect of a resource boom, meaning a one-o¤ increase in R, on the path
taken by inequality. The immediate shift in factors of production to ensure market clearing will
initially imply an increase in the growth rate of AN and a decrease in the growth rate of AT relative
to the (common) rates of growth in the sectors that obtained before the boom, so that LN > 

LN
and _= < 0. In the transition to the long run the relative productivity  will continue to fall, and
LN decrease, until LN = 

LN is again reached and a lower equilibrium level of  is obtained.
From Proposition 5 and Lemma 1, the long run level of I and therefore G is independent of R.
Resource income inequality GR is independent of R by assumption. We can thus invoke Lemma
2 to conclude that the long run e¤ect of resource booms on total income inequality GT works
solely through the induced increase in the proportion of resource income in total income, in case
1, as well as through changes in the correctional term in cases 2 and 3. The following proposition
summarizes these results.
Proposition 6 Under conditions of balanced growth, a permanent increase in resource income R
will have no long run e¤ect on G. The long run e¤ect on GT is signed as follows: in cases 1 and
3 of Lemma 2, GT will fall (rise) if GR < G (GR > G). In case 2, GR < G is a su¢ cient, but not
a necessary, condition to produce a fall in GT .
Given the variation in the relative degrees of non-resource and resource income inequality across
countries, as well as the fact that a large proportion of resource income relative to total income is
required to induce substantial changes in the long run value of GT following resource booms, we
expect to nd little or no change in long run income inequality in response to resource booms.
4A natural question our model allows us to examine is how the structure of LBD e¤ects determines the level of
long run equilibrium inequality in the balanced growth economy. An analysis of the issue, omitted due to space
limitations, is available from the authors upon request.
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3 The Empirical Analysis
We now turn to the empirical analysis in which we test the theoretical prediction that income
inequality will fall in the short run immediately after a resource boom, and will then increase
steadily over time until the initial impact of the boom disappears. In this section, we describe
the methodology and the data. Table 1a reports summary statistics. The empirical literature on
natural resources and inequality predominantly relies on cross-sectional regressions, which su¤er
from acknowledged limitations. They are unable to identify dynamics and are therefore particularly
ill-suited for testing the short- and long-run e¤ects of resource booms on inequality. They also
su¤er from omitted variable bias and it is therefore crucial to move from cross-country to panel
data evidence(Van der Ploeg, 2006). For these reasons, we employ a panel data estimator with
country xed e¤ects and regional time dummies to reduce concerns of omitted variables. We
exploit variation in the world prices of a countrys commodity exports to identify resource booms,
as world prices are typically una¤ected by individual countries and are therefore likely to be
exogenous (Deaton and Miller, 1995).5 In particular, we analyze the e¤ects of commodity export
prices on income inequality using the following dynamic panel data model in error-correction form6 :
Gi;t = i + 
0zi;t + Gi;t 1 + 01xi;t 1 + 2Gi;t 1 + 
0
3xi;t + i;t (13)
In the above equation, the subscripts i = 1; :::N and t = 1; :::T index the countries and years in
the panel, respectively. Here Gi;t stands for household income inequality in country i in year t,
i is a country-specic xed e¤ect, and zi;t is an rT 1 vector of regional time dummies, where
r is the number of regions.7 The term xi;t 1 is an m 1 vector of m variables that are expected
to a¤ect inequality in the short and/or long run. Our dataset includes all countries and years for
5Since some major commodity-exporting countries may have an inuence on world prices, we investigate the
robustness of our results to the exclusion of major exporters as part of our sensitivity analysis.
6The error-correction form is a convenient reparameterization of an autoregressive distributed lag model with 2
lagged levels of the dependent variable and the contemporaneous and rst lagged level of the independent variables.
7The regional time dummies capture year xed e¤ects for the following regions: Central and Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, East Asia and Pacic and Oceania, Latin America and Caribbean, North Africa and Middle
East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Europe and North-America. This categorization is based on
the classications of the World Bank and the United Nations, and on the Central and Eastern European Directory.
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which data are available, and covers 90 countries (listed in Table 1b) for the period 1965 to 1999.
We next discuss how the key components of equation (13) were constructed.
3.1 Income inequality and commodity export prices
Our measure of household income inequality, Gi;t, is the Gini index constructed by Galbraith and
Kum (2005) and is based on the Deininger and Squire (1996) household income inequality data set
and the UTIP-UNIDO data set on manufacturing pay inequality.8 It is much more comprehensive
than the Deininger and Squire inequality measure and uses a more informed lling-in of missing
observations than other studies. It should be noted that the use of existing cross-country data
sets on income inequality is not without problems. Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), for example,
point at important cross-country di¤erences in denitions of inequality and di¤erences in the data
used to construct measures of inequality, which can a¤ect the estimated inequality levels as well
as trends in inequality over time. Galbraith and Kum (2005) argue that their data set addresses
some of these problems and provides a more comparable and consistent measure of cross-country
household income inequality than the Deininger and Squire (1996) data set.
The vector xi;t 1 includes a commodity export price index, which was constructed using the
methodology of Deaton and Miller (1995). We rst collect data on world commodity prices and
commodity exports for as many commodities as data availability allowed.9 We then construct
weights by dividing the individual 1990 export values for each commodity by the total value of
1990 commodity exports for each country. These weights are held xed over time and applied to
the world price indices of the same commodities to form a country-specic geometrically weighted
index of commodity export prices.10 This index was rst constructed on a quarterly basis and
8We use the variable EHII2.3, see Galbraith and Kum (2005) for details.
9Prices are from the IMFs International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the Energy Information Administration.
Exports are from the UNCTAD Commodity Yearbook and the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook.
10Following Deaton and Miller (1995), the weights are held xed in order to construct an exogenous index that
does not include endogenous supply responses to world prices. This means that we lose some important changes
in the composition of primary exports but, as recognized by Deaton and Miller (1995), this loss is inevitable if we
are to exclude endogenous quantity changes. Moreoever, the loss is likely to be limited as the pairwise correlations
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deated by the export unit value (IFS).11 We then constructed the annual index by taking the log
of the annual average (rescaled so that 1980 = 100) of the quarterly index. Finally, to allow the
e¤ect of commodity prices to be larger for more commodity-dependent countries, we weight the
annual index by the share of commodity exports in a countrys GDP.12 In addition to this general
index, we also constructed separate indices for non-agricultural and agricultural commodities.13
Table 1b lists the shares of commodity exports in GDP. While the median share is 0:05, there is
considerable cross-country variation in the relative importance of natural resources. Some countries
hardly export resources, while others export revenues correspond to major shares of GDP (for
example Zambia and Venezuela). Despite the substantial coverage of the Galbraith and Kum
(2005) inequality data set, some large resource exporters like Nigeria, Oman and Saudi Arabia are
not included in our sample, mostly due to lack of data on income inequality.
3.2 Long run determinants of income inequality
The theoretical literature on income inequality suggests several determinants. First, inequality
has often been related to per capita income. Kuznets (1955) considered an economy with an
agricultural sector and an industrial sector. Initially, the majority of workers are employed in
agriculture. As an economy develops, workers move from low-income jobs in agriculture to higher-
income jobs in the industrial sector, which given the relative size of both sectors initially increases
income inequality. As more workers move to the high-income industrial sector and more workers
between the 1990 weights and the same weights for 1970, 1980, and 2000, are 0:74, 0:87, and 0:84, respectively,
indicating that the weights of individual resources in a countrys primary exports are relatively persistent.
11Short gaps in a few price series were lled by inter- or extrapolation. Where gaps for unimportant commodities
(share in total exports < 10% or share in GDP < 1%) would cause missing values, these price series were excluded.
12We relax the assumption that the price e¤ect linearly increases with the share of exports when we discuss the
estimation results. GDP in current US dollars is from the World Banks World Development Indicators (WDI).
13Our sample includes 15 non-agricultural commodities (aluminum, coal, copper, gasoline, ironore, lead, natural
gas, nickel, oil, phosphatrock, silver, tin, uranium, urea, zinc) and 35 agricultural commodities (bananas, barley,
butter, cocoabeans, coconutoil, co¤ee, copra, cotton, sh, groundnutoil, groundnuts, hides, jute, maize, oliveoil,
oranges, palmkerneloil, palmoil, pepper, plywood, poultry, pulp, rice, rubber, sisal, sorghum, soybeanoil, soybeans,
sugar, sunoweroil, swinemeat, tea, tobacco, wheat, wool).
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increase their income within that sector, inequality starts to fall. In addition, fewer workers in
agriculture means a higher relative wage in that sector, which further adds to the fall in inequality.
Empirical support for the Kuznets curve was found by Ahluwalia (1976) and Barro (2000).
Inequality is also often associated with education. Tinbergen (1975) showed how higher levels of
education increase the supply of skilled labour, which lowers relative wages and wage inequality. In
Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), public education is used for intra-generational income redistribution.
Initially, inequality is high and the poor median voter prefers a high level of redistribution through
public education. Over time, the increase in human capital through education lowers inequality.
Finally, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) argue that political rather than economic factors are
crucial to understanding inequality. They explain how industrialization in the West increased
inequality but also mobilized the poor by concentrating them in urban centers and factories. This
led to political instability or a threat of revolution, forcing democratization on political elites,
which led to institutional changes that encouraged redistribution and lowered inequality.
Following the theoretical literature, as well as the recent empirical work by Barro (2000), we
include three long run control variables in the vector xi;t 1: log real GDP per capita, a measure of
democracy (based on the number of political constraints), and a measure of educational attainment
(expressed as the average years of primary schooling of the population aged 15 and over).14 These
control variables are statistically signicant in the specication of equation (13).15
14GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ is from WDI, the political constraints indicator is the variable POL-
CONVfrom Henisz (2000), and the education variable is from Barro and Lee (2000) and was linearly interpolated.
15We considered a wide range of additional controls, including GDP per capita squared (to test the hypothesis
underlying the Kuznets curve), measures of secondary and higher schooling, alternative measures of democracy,
various governance indicators, measures of trade and capital account openness, ination, external debt, political
violence, commodity price volatility, measures of nancial and industrial development, natural disasters, and the
political orientation of government parties or the executive. These variables are not included in our preferred
specication because they were either not robustly signicant or severely lowered the number of observations.
However, we do use them when we test the robustness of our results in the next section.
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3.3 Testing for the existence of a long run relationship
The error-correction model in equation (13) is only appropriate if there is a long-run relationship
between income inequality and GDP per capita, democracy, and schooling.16 Testing for the
existence of such a relationship is usually done using cointegration techniques. Cointegration
requires that the individual variables are integrated of order 1, and that the residuals of a regression
of Gi;t on xi;t are stationary. To test this, we performed panel unit root tests on the levels and
the di¤erences of the variables in Gi;t and xi;t and then performed a panel cointegration test.17
The results of these tests, available upon request from the authors, indicate that the variables are
cointegrated and that the error-correction specication in equation (13) is valid.
A potential weakness of the cointegration techniques is that they require the variables to be
non-stationary. Although this assumption can be tested using unit root tests, as we have done
above, such tests are not without problems and introduce a further degree of uncertainty into
the analysis of levels relationships (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith, 2001). In addition, on theoretical
grounds, it is not obvious that income inequality should be non-stationary and cointegrated with
variables such as GDP per capita and primary schooling. Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) propose
a new approach to testing the existence of a long-run relationship which is applicable irrespective of
whether the underlying regressors are stationary or non-stationary. Their bounds testsare based
on a standard F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients of the lagged level variables
in the error-correction model are equal to zero. The asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic is
non-standard under the null of no long-run relationship. Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) provide
two sets of critical values: One set assuming that the lagged level variables are all non-stationary,
and another set assuming that they are all stationary. Evaluating the F-statistic against the two
relevant critical values from both sets, results in three possible outcomes. If the F-statistic lies
16Commodity export prices could also be part of this long-run relationship but, as will become evident below, we
do not nd evidence of a long-run e¤ect of commodity export prices on inequality.
17We use the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel unit root test for a balanced sub-sample of 17 countries and 35
years, the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root test for both the full sample and the balanced sub-sample, and
a panel cointegration test by Pedroni (1999).
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below the two relevant critical values, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, regardless of whether
the variables are stationary or non-stationary. If the F-statistic lies in between the two relevant
critical values, the result is inconclusive and rejection of the null depends on whether the variables
are stationary or non-stationary. Finally, if the F-statistic exceeds the two relevant critical values,
the null hypothesis is always rejected, regardless of whether the variables are stationary or non-
stationary. This last possibility is especially of interest in this context, as it conrms the existence
of a long-run relationship irrespective of the order of integration of the variables. Hence, even if one
doubts the conclusiveness of the panel unit root and panel cointegration tests, one can still draw
inference from the error-correction model in equation (13), as the long-run relationship assumed
in the model exists irrespective of whether the variables are I(1) or I(0). Following Pesaran, Shin
and Smith (2001), we calculated the F-statistic and evaluated it against the two relevant non-
standard critical values corresponding to the 1% signicance level. The value of the F-statistic
(10:84) exceeded the the two critical values (5:17 and 6:36) and hence we reject the null of no
long-run relationship at the 1% level. This is reassuring as it conrms the existence of a long-run
relationship between income inequality and GDP per capita, political constraints and primary
schooling, regardless of whether the variables are stationary or non-stationary.
4 Estimation Results
The results of estimating equation (13) are reported in Table 2.18 Columns (1) and (2) show
the OLS and xed e¤ects results for the baseline specication without the commodity export
price variables. The long-run variables enter with the expected signs but are only signicant in
the specication with country xed e¤ects, suggesting that the inclusion of xed e¤ects is indeed
important.19 The lagged level of inequality enters with a negative sign and is signicant at 1%.
The size of the coe¢ cient in the (preferred) xed e¤ects specication indicates that the speed of
18The long-run coe¢ cients correspond to  ( 1

)  1, while the short-run coe¢ cients correspond to , 2, and 3.
19We tested the Kuznets relation by adding GDP per capita squared but the coe¢ cient was insignicant. This
may reect that the relation has weakened over time (Anand and Kanbur, 1993) or that it works better for a cross
section of countries in a given year than for inequality within countries over time (Li, Squire and Zou, 1998).
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adjustment to long-run equilibrium is around 20% per year. The lagged change in inequality also
enters with a negative sign and is signicant. We experimented with additional lags, as well as
with lags of the changes in the long-run variables, but found these to be unimportant.
In Table 2, column (3), we include the lagged level and the change in the commodity export
price index to test the long-run and short-run e¤ects of commodity export prices on inequality. The
long-run coe¢ cient is positive but highly insignicant, indicating that commodity export prices do
not a¤ect the long-run level of inequality.20 The short-run coe¢ cient is negative, suggesting that
commodity booms lower inequality in the same year. However, the coe¢ cient is not signicant so
should be viewed with caution.21 In Table 2, column (4), we drop the lagged level of the commodity
export price index and nd a similar result for the change in the index.
We next investigate whether the short-run e¤ect of higher commodity prices varies across non-
agricultural and agricultural commodities by replacing the change in the general index with the
changes in the sub-indices for both types of commodities. As we explain below, this distinction
may be important as the revenues from non-agricultural exports typically accrue to governments,
whereas the revenues from agricultural exports accrue predominantly to farmer households. The
20Collier and Goderis (2008) show that commodity booms have adverse long-term e¤ects on GDP per capita.
We investigated the possibility that commodity export prices a¤ect long-run inequality indirectly through GDP per
capita by rerunning the specication in Table 2, column (3), for the same sample but without GDP per capita. The
commodity export price index now entered with a negative sign but the coe¢ cient remained highly insignicant
with a p-value of 0:95, suggesting that any indirect e¤ect of commodity prices through GDP per capita is likely to be
negligible. As an alternative way of testing the long-run relation between natural resources and income inequality,
we also ran cross-sectional OLS regressions of the level of inequality on commodity exports over GDP and several
controls, all in 1990 (see Alexeev and Conrad, 2009, for a similar approach to testing the relation between natural
resources and long-run economic growth ). Using 10 alternative sets of controls from both our panel analysis and
Barro (2000), we do not nd a signicant e¤ect of natural resources on the long-run level of inequality, consistent
with our panel data results. For robustness, we also ran the regressions with inequality in 1999 (the last available
year) to allow any e¤ect to take more time, and with inequality in 1999 and independent variables in 2000. In both
cases, we again do not nd a robustly signicant e¤ect of natural resources on long-run inequality.
21We experimented with lags of the change in the commodity export price index but found these to be unimportant.
We also allowed for an e¤ect of higher oil prices on oil importing countries by including an oil import price index,
but found no evidence of a systematic e¤ect. All our results go through when including this oil import price index.
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results are reported in Table 2, column (5). Both variables enter with a negative sign but the
change in the non-agricultural export price index is now signicant at 5%. This indicates that a
rise in the prices of non-agricultural commodities lowers inequality in the same year. The change in
the agricultural index is not signicant but its coe¢ cient is only slightly smaller than the coe¢ cient
for the change in the non-agricultural index. In fact, an F-test did not reject the null hypothesis
of equal coe¢ cients with a p-value of 0.96.22 A possible reason for why we only nd a statistically
signicant e¤ect for non-agricultural exports is that the sample variation of the change in the
agricultural index is smaller than the variation of the change in the non-agricultural index. The
standard error of the coe¢ cient is therefore larger and the signicance lower. This could explain
why the estimated coe¢ cients for non-agricultural and agricultural exports are similar in size and
not signicantly di¤erent, while the standard error of the latter coe¢ cient is much higher. But
the di¤erence in signicance may also reect a genuine di¤erence in spending patterns. Non-
agricultural revenues typically end up with governments, which may spend a relatively large part
of it, whereas revenues from agriculture accrue mostly to farmers, who may save more. Robinson,
Torvik and Verdier (2006) argue that politicians discount the future by the probability of being in
power and therefore over-extract natural resources. The same argument could be used to explain
why politicians consume a larger part of the revenues out of resource booms. A recent study by
the World Bank (2006) indeed indicates that countries with a large share of mineral and energy
(non-agricultural) rents in GNI typically have lower genuine saving rates. Using data from this
study, we ran a cross-sectional OLS regression of the genuine saving rate on the share of non-
agricultural commodity exports in GDP from our dataset. Consistent with the ndings of the
World Bank, we nd a negative coe¢ cient, signicant at 1%, suggesting that countries with a
22Since its long-run coe¢ cient was insignicant in Table 2, column (3), we exclude the lagged level of the com-
modity export price index from the specications of Table 2, columns (5) and (6), and Table 3, columns (1) to
(4). However, all results on the short-run e¤ects of non-agricultural and agricultural export prices are robust to
the inclusion of the lagged level of the commodity export price index or the lagged level of the non-agricultural
index. When included, their long-run coe¢ cients are always insignicant, consistent with our earlier nding that
commodity prices do not a¤ect long-run inequality. We also experimented with the agricultural index but again
found no signicant long-run e¤ect.
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large share of non-agricultural exports on average have lower genuine saving rates. We then ran
the same regression for agricultural exports and now found a positive but insignicant coe¢ cient,
suggesting that, in contrast to non-agricultural exporters, agricultural resource exporters do not
have lower genuine saving rates.23 Although these correlations should not be interpreted as causal,
they are consistent with the hypothesis that non-agricultural resource booms have stronger Dutch
disease e¤ects because governments consume a larger part of the revenues from booms than farmers.
In Table 2, column (6), we exclude the insignicant e¤ect of agricultural prices and nd almost
identical results. These results are consistent with our theoretical prediction that inequality should
fall in the short run in response to a resource boom.
We next use the results in Table 2, column (6), to graphically show the time path of inequality
following a resource boom. Figure 2 shows three impulse response functions of inequality for a two
standard deviations (33 % points) increase in the growth rate of non-agricultural export prices for
countries with di¤erent levels of non-agricultural exports. The estimated declines in inequality in
the year of the boom are 0:11, 0:22, and 0:32 Gini index points for countries with 10%, 20%, or
30% non-agricultural exports to GDP, respectively.24 After its decline in the year of the boom,
inequality gradually moves back to its original pre-boom level. The speed of adjustment is such
that around ve years after the shock, two thirds of its initial impact has died out. These results
on the time path of inequality after a boom lend support to the predictions from the theory.
It should be noted that, while the e¤ect of resource booms is important for resource-rich
countries, it is (unsurprisingly) much less so for other countries. Recall that we allow for this in
our estimations by weighting the commodity export price indices by a countrys share of commodity
exports in GDP.25 Hence, for the median country in our sample with a share of non-agricultural
23 Including both non-agricultural and agricultural exports in one regression yielded almost identical results.
24These estimates were calculated by multiplying the coe¢ cient in Table 2, column (6), by the share of non-
agricultural exports in GDP and the two standard deviations price change (e.g.  3:26  0:10  0:33 =  0:11).
25This assumes that the importance of price e¤ects linearly increases with the share of exports. Since price e¤ects
may only matter for countries with high export levels, we re-estimated the specications in Table 2, but decomposing
the e¤ects of commodity export prices into the e¤ects for the top quintile exporters and the e¤ects for the other
sample countries. The coe¢ cients for the top quintile exporters were not signicantly di¤erent from the coe¢ cients
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exports in GDP of only 0:01, the estimated short-run decline in inequality from a two standard
deviations increase in the growth rate of non-agricultural prices is only  3:26  0:01  0:33 = 0:01
Gini index points. But for resource-rich countries with shares of 0:09 (80th percentile of sample
distribution), 0:14 (90th percentile), 0:18 (95th percentile), and 0:34 (99th percentile), the estimated
declines in inequality are 0:10, 0:15, 0:19 and 0:37 Gini index points, respectively.
We next test the robustness of our nding that higher non-agricultural commodity prices lower
short-run inequality. Table 3, column (1), shows the results when excluding the regional time
dummies. The short-run e¤ect of non-agricultural export prices remains signicant at 5%, while
the size of the coe¢ cient is somewhat smaller. In Table 3, column (2), we decompose the change in
the non-agricultural index into positive and negative changes. The coe¢ cient for the positive shocks
is negative, signicant at 5%, and larger than the coe¢ cient in earlier specications, conrming that
resource booms lower inequality in the year of the boom. Although the coe¢ cient for the negative
shocks is insignicant, it is also negative and is not signicantly di¤erent from the coe¢ cient for
positive shocks, hence suggesting that pooling positive and negative shocks is appropriate. This
is consistent with our theory, which predicts that the short run response of the Gini to a resource
bust would be opposite in sign, but generally similar in magnitude, to the response to a boom.
Table 3, column (3), shows that our results are also robust to using OLS instead of xed e¤ects.
Although world commodity prices are typically una¤ected by individual countries and our
indices exclude endogenous supply responses, our estimates could su¤er from endogeneity if major
commodity exporters have an inuence on world prices. To address this concern, we express
individual countriesexports of each commodity as a share of world exports. We nd that of the
90 countries in our sample, 22 countries export at least one commodity for which their share in
world exports exceeds 20%, while 34 countries export at least one commodity for which their share
in world exports exceeds 10%. We investigate whether excluding these major exporters a¤ects our
for the other countries. We also tested whether price e¤ects only occur in case of large shocks by adding squared
terms of the price indices to the specications in Table 2, columns (3) to (6), but the coe¢ cients of the squared
terms were not signicant. The absence of non-linearities beyond the linearly increasing importance of price e¤ects
suggests that the weighting of the indices by a countrys share of exports in GDP is appropriate.
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results by re-estimating the specication in Table 2, column (6), for a sub-sample without the 22
countries with exports larger than 20% and a sub-sample without the 34 countries with exports
larger than 10%. Although this decreases the sample size by almost a third and half, respectively,
the coe¢ cient of the change in the non-agricultural price index only marginally changes from  3:26
(5% signicance) to  3:30 (10% signicance) and  3:76 (10% signicance) for the two sub-samples,
respectively. Hence, our results do not seem to be biased by major commodity exporters.
Endogeneity could also arise from weighting the commodity export price indices by a countrys
share of commodity exports in GDP, as this share may be driven by time-varying factors that
also a¤ect inequality, such as government policies. Resource-rich countries with bad policies that
cause low growth and high inequality, for example, also tend to have high shares of commodity
exports in GDP due to the lack of development of their non-resource sectors. This implies that we
attach high weights to poor countries, which could bias the results. To address this concern, we
instrument for the share of non-agricultural exports in GDP, using estimates of the per capita stock
of sub-soil assets in 2000 from the World Bank (2006) as an instrument. These estimates are based
on the net present value of a countrys expected benets over a horizon of 20 years and include
13 commodities, 12 of which are also included in our non-agricultural index. Since the share of
non-agricultural exports in GDP only enters our specications as a weight of the non-agricultural
export price index, we create an instrument by reconstructing the index but weighting it by the
value of per capita sub-soil assets instead of the share of non-agricultural exports in GDP. We then
use the change in this variable as an instrument for the change in the non-agricultural export price
index in the specication of Table 2, column (6). For this instrument to be valid, it should be
correlated with the (potentially) endogenous regressor and not be correlated with the error term.
The rst requirement is likely to be fullled, as a countrys level of commodity exports is correlated
with its natural wealth. The second requirement is less likely to be fullled, as countries with high
inequality tend to be poorer and have smaller resource stocks due to less geological exploration
and more overexploitation. Weighting by the value of sub-soil assets may therefore imply giving
high weights to rich countries. Although this could bias the results, the direction of the bias is
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likely to be opposite to the bias in the uninstrumented regressions, where high weights were given
to poor countries. Comparing the coe¢ cients of the instrumented and uninstrumented regressions
can therefore shed light on the size of the potential bias and the numerical range within which
the actual coe¢ cient is likely to be located. The second-stage IV results are reported in Table
3, column (4).26 The change in the non-agricultural export index again enters with a negative
sign and, although the coe¢ cient is no longer signicant, it is somewhat larger than in Table 2,
column (6). Given that any biases in the OLS and IV estimates are likely to have opposite signs,
this suggests that the bias in the OLS estimates is likely to be small and, if anything, leads to
an underestimation of the short-run e¤ect of non-agricultural export prices. In fact, a Davidson-
MacKinnon test of exogeneity did not reject the null of exogeneity with a p-value of 0:71.27
Finally, we performed 50 other robustness checks by adding additional controls to the speci-
cation in Table 2, column (6). The variables we consider are GDP squared, alternative measures
of schooling, alternative indicators of democracy, several indicators of institutional quality, several
indicators that capture the type of government (left wing, centre, or right wing), and a range
of variables from the empirical growth literature. The results conrmed our nding that higher
non-agricultural export prices lower inequality in the same year.28
26The instrument enters with the expected positive sign and is signicant at 1% in the rst stage.
27For robustness, we repeated the IV estimation using the 1994 estimates of sub-soil assets instead of the 2000
ones and found similar results. We also performed the IV estimation for the two sub-samples in which we exclude
the major commodity exporters. The coe¢ cients for the change in the non-agricultural index were similar or larger:
 3:94 (2000 sub-soil assets) and  4:05 (1994 sub-soil assets) for the sub-sample without the countries with exports
> 20 %, and  7:17and  6:81 for the sub-sample without the countries with exports > 10 %.
28For each additional control, we ran a regression with the lagged level and a regression with the lagged level,
contemporaneous di¤erence, and any additional signicant lagged di¤erences. The coe¢ cient of the change in the
non-agricultural index had a mean value of  3:43 and varied between  5:29 and  2:15, which is close to the value
in Table 2, column (6). It was signicant at 5% in 32 cases, signicant at 10% in 11 other cases, and insignicant
in 7 cases. In 6 of these last 7 cases, additional estimations revealed that the coe¢ cient turned insignicant due to
the smaller sample and not because of the additional control. We also ran two regressions including all additional
controls together. Despite the substantially smaller sample, the coe¢ cient remained signicant at 10%.
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4.1 Commodity price volatility and uncertainty
We have so far ignored an important alternative channel through which natural resources may
a¤ect long-run inequality: the volatility of commodity prices. Volatility reduces the collateral
value of inventories which increases borrowing costs, especially for poor credit constrained rms
or farm households. In addition, volatility increases the incidence of defaults among the poor, as
they typically lack savings and access to liquidity to deal with adverse price shocks. But it could
also raise inequality by forcing poor farmers to diversify their crops, which reduces their benets
from specialization (Dehn, 2000). And nally, volatility can increase inequality through lowering
investments by poor risk-averse investors (Servén, 1998, Zeira, 1990).
If volatility indeed a¤ects long-run inequality and is correlated with our commodity export
price index, our estimate of the long-run e¤ect of commodity prices may (partly) reect the e¤ect
of the volatility of prices rather than the level. To investigate this possibility, we constructed a
measure of volatility by taking the pre-1983 (median sample year) mean absolute change in the
unweighted commodity export price index (multiplied by 100) for the years until 1983 and the
post-1982 mean absolute change for the years from 1983. We added the rst lag of this variable,
weighted by commodity exports over GDP, to the specication of Table 2, column (3), in which we
estimated the long-run e¤ect of commodity export prices. The long-run coe¢ cient of commodity
export prices changed from 0:48 to  0:14 but remained insignicant (p-value = 0:98). The long-
run coe¢ cient of volatility had the expected positive sign, indicating that volatility leads to higher
long-run inequality, but the coe¢ cient was insignicant (p-value = 0:23).29
The volatility measure described above reects ex post volatility in the sense that it captures
realized changes in commodity prices. However, ex ante uncertainty about prices may be more
important for inequality than realized volatility. Moreover, ex post volatility includes all price
29We found the same coe¢ cient for volatility when excluding the lagged level of the commodity price index.
For robustness, we constructed a second measure of volatility by calculating for each quarter the country-specic
standard deviation of the quarterly commodity export price index from section 3.1 over the quarter and the three
quarters preceding it, and then taking the log of the annual average of this rolling standard deviation, weighted
by exports over GDP. Using this measure, we found the same results as for the rst volatility measure.
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movements, while ex ante uncertainty should only include the unpredictable component of price
changes (Ramey and Ramey, 1995, Servén, 1998). We therefore also experimented with a measure
of export price uncertainty. Following Dehn (2000) and Servén (1998), we estimate for each country
separately the following generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH (1,1))
model in which actual price volatility is explained by past volatility and past expected volatility:
It = 0 + 1t+ 1It 1 + 2It 2 + 3Dt + "t
2t = 0 + 1"
2
t 1 + 2
2
t 1 (14)
where It is the unweighted log commodity export price index in quarter t, t is a linear time trend,
Dt is a vector of quarterly dummies to remove seasonal e¤ects, and 2t denotes the variance of "t,
conditional upon information up to period t. We use the annual average of the tted values of the
second equation in (14), weighted by the % share of exports in GDP, as a measure of commodity
export price uncertainty, since it captures the predicted variance of the changes in commodity prices
from past actual and expected volatility. We add this measure of uncertainty to the specication of
Table 2, column (3). The results are reported in Table 3, column (5). The long-run coe¢ cient for
commodity export prices remains insignicant, but the long-run e¤ect of commodity export price
uncertainty on income inequality is positive and signicant at 1%. This indicates that it is the
ex ante uncertainty about export prices that matters signicantly for long-run income inequality.
For robustness, we reran the same specication without the lagged level of the commodity export
price index and found an almost identical long-run coe¢ cient for volatility (results reported in
Table 3, column (6)). For a country like the Republic of Congo with commodity exports of 29% of
GDP, the results in Table 3, column (5), imply that an increase of two standard deviations in the
predicted volatility of export prices (the annual average of the tted values of the second equation
in (14)) leads to a 1:33  29  0:028 = 1:1 point increase in the long-run Gini index of inequality.
Summarizing, our estimates of the long-run e¤ect of commodity prices on income inequality
do not seem to be explained by price volatility or uncertainty. When controlling for volatility or
uncertainty, we still nd an insignicant long-run e¤ect. However, our results do indicate that
uncertainty about commodity export prices signicantly increases long-run inequality, consistent
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with the notion that the poor are less able to deal with booms and busts than the rich.
5 Conclusions
This paper has theoretically and empirically analyzed the time path of income inequality following
a natural resource boom. Our main nding is that resource booms, especially oil and mineral
booms, lower inequality in the year of the boom. This e¤ect then gradually diminishes over time
until inequality returns to its pre-boom level in the long run. Our complementary nding that
commodity price uncertainty increases long-run income inequality is of independent interest and
provides an interesting avenue for future research.
Two comments are in order. First, although our sample includes 90 countries, some large
resource exporters like Nigeria, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, are not included, mostly due to lack of
data on income inequality. As more inequality data become available, it may be worthwhile to
investigate whether our ndings extend to these countries. Second, this paper has ignored some
alternative mechanisms through which booms may a¤ect inequality. One example is public sector
employment. Resource windfalls often generate new government jobs, which may reduce income
inequality (Ross, 2007). However, such jobs are often created to buy political support and may
come at a cost of lower growth (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006).
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5
To derive the condition for dynamic stability, we must determine the sign of the rate of change of
relative productivity growth. This is found by computing
d( _=)
dt
=  

[uL(1  N ) + vL(1  T )]dLN
d
+ [uS(1  N ) + vS(1  T )]dSN
d

d
dt
(15)
For stability, we need d(
_=)
dt to take the opposite sign from
d
dt . This condition is satised if and
only if the static e¤ect of increased  on the linear combination of both types of employment in the
N sector, which is given by the large term in parenthesis in the above expression, is positive. Since
dLN
d and
dSN
d take the same sign always, we can reduce the problem of determining dynamic
stability to the problem of determining necessary and su¢ cient conditions for dLNd > 0. This
amounts to the same thing as in Torvik (2001): dynamic stability requires that   1: The
comparative static computations are available from the authors upon request, and the intuition is
similar to that in Torvik (2001). Low demand elasticity induces demand-side shifts in consumption
patterns that are su¢ cient to counteract the factor movement e¤ects, due to technical change biased
in favor of one sector, that would otherwise result in complete specialization for  > 1:
Now let us solve for long run inequality and factor allocations. In equilibrium, the values of LN
and SN are xed by two conditions. The rst is the dynamic stability condition given by equation
11. The second is factor market equilibrium (characterized by factor price equalization between
the sectors and prot maximization). Factor market equilibrium denes the contract curve, which
traces out the locus of pairs (LN ; SN ) in the Edgeworth-Bowley box for the economy. For the
Cobb-Douglas production functions we have assumed, the contract curve is dened by the relation
ST
LT
LT
ST
=
SN
LN
LN
SN
: (16)
Both sides of the above equation are equal to our measure of inequality I and are independent of
. Making the substitutions LT = 1  LN , and ST = 1  SN ; which must obtain according to
full utilization of unskilled and skilled labor, and using the fact that equation 11 must hold in a
long run dynamic equilibrium, it follows that the equilibrium fraction of unskilled labor in the N
sector, which we will denote by LN , is determined by the solution to equation 12.
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Table 1a Summary statistics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Household income inequality (Gini index) 1988 41.39 6.70 24.07 59.09
 Household income inequality (Gini index) 1988 0.11 1.44 -14.72 11.06
Real GDP per capita (log) 1988 8.02 1.48 4.69 10.73
Political constraints 1988 0.43 0.33 0.00 0.89
Primary schooling (average number of years) 1988 3.94 1.63 0.47 7.70
Commodity export price index 1958 0.33 0.33 0.00 1.87
Unlogged unweighted index (1980=100) 1958 85.70 26.88 17.60 224.48
 Commodity export price index 1958 -0.00 0.02 -0.23 0.31
 Unlogged unweighted index (1980=100) 1958 -0.79 13.02 -103.10 76.40
Commodity exports to GDP (ratio) 1988 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.35
 Non-agricultural commodity export price index 1958 -0.00 0.02 -0.23 0.31
Non-agricultural commodity exports to GDP (ratio) 1988 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.34
 Agricultural commodity export price index 1958 -0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.06
Agricultural commodity exports to GDP (ratio) 1988 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.22
Table 1b Sample countries (ISO alpha-3 codes) and their shares of commodity exports in GDP
zmb 0.35 hnd 0.20 cmr 0.15 cri 0.11 sen 0.06 nld 0.05 phl 0.03 prt 0.02 hkg 0.01 bgd 0.01
ven 0.32 tto 0.19 mus 0.15 col 0.11 bdi 0.06 tha 0.04 zaf 0.03 hun 0.02 fra 0.01 aut 0.01
lbr 0.30 isl 0.19 syr 0.15 zwe 0.09 per 0.06 ury 0.04 pol 0.03 brb 0.02 esp 0.01 ita 0.00
cog 0.29 png 0.18 dza 0.15 gtm 0.08 slv 0.06 mex 0.04 irl 0.03 caf 0.02 ind 0.01 kwt 0.00
swz 0.22 jam 0.18 tgo 0.14 dom 0.07 nzl 0.06 gmb 0.04 grc 0.02 n 0.02 tur 0.01 lso 0.00
sgp 0.21 nic 0.17 irn 0.14 lka 0.07 ken 0.06 uga 0.04 chn 0.02 gbr 0.02 hti 0.01 npl 0.00
ecu 0.21 nor 0.17 bol 0.12 aus 0.07 jor 0.05 rwa 0.04 egy 0.02 cyp 0.02 usa 0.01 ben 0.00
mys 0.21 chl 0.16 fji 0.12 bwa 0.07 can 0.05 dnk 0.04 bra 0.02 swe 0.02 isr 0.01 bel 0.00
mwi 0.20 idn 0.15 gha 0.11 tun 0.06 pan 0.05 arg 0.03 pak 0.02 moz 0.01 kor 0.01 jpn 0.00
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Table 2 Estimation results: baseline specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimates of long-run coe¢ cients
GDP per capita (log) -2.26 -4.02*** -4.12*** -4.11*** -4.11*** -4.12***
(1.71) (1.49) (1.48) (1.48) (1.49) (1.48)
Political constraints -0.40 -3.02** -3.15** -3.14** -3.14** -3.14**
(3.82) (1.26) (1.25) (1.26) (1.26) (1.25)
Primary schooling -0.15 -1.45* -1.52* -1.51* -1.52* -1.52*
(0.93) (0.82) (0.86) (0.82) (0.82) (0.82)
Commodity export price index 0.48
(6.60)
Estimates of short-run coe¢ cients
Inequalityt 1 -0.05*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
 Inequalityt 1 -0.18*** -0.14** -0.14** -0.14** -0.14** -0.14**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
 Commodity export price indext -2.40 -2.45
(1.75) (1.62)
 Non-agricultural export price indext -3.23** -3.26**
(1.53) (1.54)
 Agricultural export price indext -2.88
(6.93)
Country xed e¤ects NO YES YES YES YES YES
Regional time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1988 1988 1958 1958 1958 1958
R-squared (within) 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in inequality in year t. Robust standard errors are clustered by
country and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 3 Estimation results: sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimates of long-run coe¢ cients
GDP per capita (log) 1.75 -4.13*** -2.29 -5.22*** -4.08*** -4.09***
(2.20) (1.48) (1.70) (1.19) (1.49) (1.49)
Political constraints 0.07 -3.13** -0.21 -2.46** -3.18** -3.19**
(2.20) (1.25) (3.80) (0.98) (1.26) (1.27)
Primary schooling 1.79** -1.53* -0.17 -1.28** -1.50* -1.51*
(0.86) (0.82) (0.93) (0.63) (0.87) (0.82)
Commodity export price index -0.61
(6.54)
Uncertainty 1.33*** 1.32***
(0.42) (0.45)
Estimates of short-run coe¢ cients
Inequalityt 1 -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.05*** -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.20***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
 Inequalityt 1 -0.15** -0.14** -0.19*** -0.07*** -0.14** -0.14**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
 Commodity export price indext -2.41 -2.34
(1.74) (1.62)
 Non-agricultural indext -2.37** -3.75** -4.23
(1.18) (1.73) (2.97)
 Non-agricultural indext-positive -4.16**
(1.77)
 Non-agricultural indext-negative -2.24
(2.93)
Method FE FE OLS FE-2SLS FE FE
Regional time dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1958 1958 1958 1802 1958 1958
R-squared (within) 0.09 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.23
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in inequality in year t. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Figure 1 The Edgeworth-Bowley box with dynamically stable skilled and unskilled labor allocations
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Figure 2 The time path of inequality following a resource boom
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Figure 2 is based on the estimation results in Table 2, column (6). It shows impulse response
functions of inequality for a two standard deviations (33% points) shock to the growth rate of
non-agricultural export prices in period 0, for countries with shares of non-agricultural exports in
GDP of 10%, 20%, or 30%.
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